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LEARNING TO LISTEN TO RUTH
BADER GINSBURG
Linda Greenhouse*
Because this special Symposium issue of the New York City
Law Review is filled with articles analyzing Justice Ginsburg’s life
and work, I decided that this introduction could most usefully take
a somewhat different approach to the subject. My focus is not what
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has told the Supreme Court over the years,
both as advocate and Justice, but rather the impact that her words
and ideas had on her audience.
I want to focus on one particular member of that audience,
Justice Harry A. Blackmun. He was her Supreme Court colleague
for only one year, October Term 1993, but for twenty-two years
before that, ever since Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg submitted
her brief on the merits for the appellant in Reed v. Reed,1 he had
been one of her most important listeners. This focus will add some
value to the perspectives presented in this Symposium issue, I
think, because quite often, Justice Blackmun was a skeptical lis-
tener. We know this not only from his votes in such cases as Fron-
tiero v. Richardson,2 in which he rejected Professor Ginsburg’s call to
subject sex discrimination to strict scrutiny, but from the notes and
memos contained in the voluminous collection of his papers,3
opened to the public by the Library of Congress a week before Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s visit to the law school. By the end of his career,
Justice Blackmun was such an icon of feminism that I was quite
taken aback to see that when it came to women’s issues, especially
but not only early in his career, he could best be characterized as a
grumpy old man. Whatever Ruth Ginsburg was selling, Harry
Blackmun was not buying.
That fact, as well as the fact that he eventually did work his way
around to her point of view, is a reminder both of the context in
* B.A., Radcliffe College, 1968; M.S.L., Yale Law School, 1978. Since 1978, the
author has been Supreme Court Correspondent for The New York Times. She won a
Pulitzer Prize in journalism in 1998 for her coverage of the Court. Her biography of
Justice Blackmun, based on his papers at the Library of Congress, will be published in
May 2005 by Times Books/Henry Holt.
1 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
2 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
3 See Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2004, at A1 for an analysis of Justice Blackmun’s papers.
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which Ruth Ginsburg began her Supreme Court advocacy and of
the impact she had. The arguments she made struck many of the
middle-aged men who heard them as counter-intuitive. What could
possibly be wrong with laws aimed at protecting women from
harm, sheltering them from the consequences of their limited
earning capacity, taking into account the biological and cultural
imperatives of motherhood? The fact that she often brought these
questions to the Court in cases with male plaintiffs was all the more
unsettling. Under her rigorous analysis and presentation, tectonic
plates began to shift, as this Symposium issue documents, but
Harry Blackmun’s journey reminds us that there was nothing inevi-
table about where they would come to rest.
That he was not the first in line to enlist in Ruth Bader Gins-
burg’s crusade is hardly surprising for a man born in 1908, who
graduated from Harvard Law School a full generation before that
august institution deemed women worthy of attending (and it was
only last year that Harvard Law School got a female dean).4 At the
time Ruth Ginsburg started bringing cases to the court in her ca-
pacity as director of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, official dis-
crimination on account of sex was simply not considered a
constitutional harm – no more so than discrimination on account
of eye color or height would have been. Her challenge was to
deconstruct the layers of paternalism and stereotyped assumptions
through which women, even when receiving especially beneficial
treatment, were disabled from participating as full citizens in the
civic affairs of the country.
She accomplished this case by case, through a careful litiga-
tion strategy in which the challengers to the status quo were just as
likely to be men as women. Some of her most significant victories
came on behalf of male petitioners who were disadvantaged by as-
sumptions built into various social service laws about women being
in special need of the state’s solicitude. The first case she brought
to the court was Reed v. Reed,5 argued in October of 1971, the start
of Harry Blackmun’s second term. This was not one of her six Su-
preme Court arguments, but she was counsel of record for the
ACLU. The case challenged an Idaho probate law under which a
man received an automatic preference over a similarly situated wo-
man for court appointment to administer an estate. Ruth Gins-
4 Sam Dillon, First Woman Is Appointed as Dean of Harvard Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2003, at A18 (reporting appointment of Elena Kagan and noting that the school did
not admit women until 1953).
5 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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burg’s client was Sally Reed, the mother of a young man who
committed suicide, dying intestate. She and her husband were sep-
arated. Each applied to be named administrator of their son’s very
small estate. Under the preference provision of the Idaho probate
law, in which “males must be preferred to females” if both were
“equally entitled,” the father, Cecil Reed, received the appoint-
ment.6 Sally Reed challenged this outcome, but the law was upheld
in the Idaho Supreme Court, basically on the ground of adminis-
trative convenience. The statutory preference for men “is neither
an illogical nor arbitrary method devised by the legislature to re-
solve an issue that would otherwise require a hearing as to the rela-
tive merits” of competing claims, the state court said.7
Ruth Ginsburg’s challenge to the statute, and to that opinion,
proved to be a hole-in-one. The court overturned both, unani-
mously, in a seven-page opinion by Chief Justice Burger. Clearly
the statute did serve an objective, the court said, one that was not
completely illegitimate. But it was simply not a weighty enough ob-
jective to overcome the constitutional command of equal protec-
tion. The automatic preference was “the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause,” the
court said.8 By providing dissimilar treatment for similarly situated
men and women, “the challenged section violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.”9 In other words, convenience was not enough. Al-
though by its terms, the opinion applied nothing more rigorous
than rational basis review, this was rational basis with teeth: dis-
crimination on account of sex violated the Constitution.
Harry Blackmun went along, but he was not particularly
happy. “The ACLU, on behalf of the appellant mother here, has
filed a very lengthy brief filled with emotion and historical context
about the inferior status of women,”10 he wrote in his notes to him-
self while preparing for the argument. His note after argument,
when the handwriting was on the wall for reversal, said: “Avoid an
emotional opinion about women’s rights. Write it narrowly.”11
When I read these notes, I wondered what could have been in
Ruth Ginsburg’s brief that struck Justice Blackmun as so over the
top. So I went up to the Supreme Court library and called for the
6 Id. at 73.
7 Id. at 76.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 77.
10 Harry A. Blackmun Collection (“H.A.B. Collection”), Library of Congress Manu-
script Division, Container 135, folder 10.
11 Id.
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brief. While at sixty-eight pages it was not drastically longer than
the fifty pages permitted by the Court’s current rules,12 this was the
mother of all sex discrimination briefs, clearly aimed at educating
the court on a scale that went considerably beyond the challenge to
an Idaho probate law.
Citing Gunnar Myrdal and other social commentators and
critics, the brief sought to get into the Supreme Court record, and
the justices’ collective consciousness, the disadvantaged status of
women in society—“pervasive social, cultural, and legal roots of
sex-based discrimination,” as the brief put it.13 “American women
have been stigmatized historically as an inferior class and are today
subject to pervasive discrimination . . . A person born female con-
tinues to be branded inferior for this congenital and unalterable
condition of birth.”14
These were hardly radical observations, even in 1971. Whether
they were too emotional I will leave for others to decide. As a legal
matter, the brief asked for official discrimination on account of sex
to be accorded strict judicial scrutiny. That did not happen, not
then, not two years later when the strict scrutiny argument got only
four votes in Frontiero15—and, I should point out, not yet.
But Ruth Ginsburg kept coming back, making her arguments.
Her actual argument, as opposed to the briefing, seems to have
been crucial in persuading Justice Blackmun to see things her way
in a 1975 case, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,16 a challenge to a federal
social security provision that granted survivors’ benefits to the
widow as well as to the children of a deceased male wage-earner,
based on his earnings, but withheld similar benefits from a wid-
ower. Justice Blackmun’s clerk, Richard Blumenthal, now the attor-
ney general of Connecticut, urged him to vote to uphold the
statute against the charge of unconstitutional sex discrimination
brought by Ruth Ginsburg’s male client. “No doubt, the statute’s
provision rests on a stereotype—a stereotype that has greatly di-
minished validity,”17 the law clerk wrote. But he said it did still have
some validity, based on the income disparities between the typical
man and the typical woman. “The objective is to alleviate need.
Women are more likely to be needy, even in this increasingly liber-
12 SUP. CT. R. 33.
13 Brief for Appellant at 10, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
14 Id. at 25.
15 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
16 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
17 H.A.B. Collection, Container 203, folder 6.
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ated age. The statute would seem to be constitutional.”18
Justice Blackmun’s notes indicate that he was inclined to
agree. In his pre-argument memo to himself, he wrote: “Widows
with children are more likely to need social security benefits than
widowers with children. This is due to the fact that the widower
usually is working and enjoys a higher income than his female
counterpart.”19 If this premise was outmoded, he said, the argu-
ment should be made to Congress and not to the court. “So long as
the objective of the differential is to alleviate need, I suspect that
we shall have to hold that the differential is not unconstitutional.
For the moment, therefore, I shall vote to reverse.”20
But Justice Blackmun’s mind changed as he listened to Ruth
Ginsburg’s argument. “It is a good clean case, factually,”21 he noted
to himself while on the bench. “The differential does seem rather
useless.”22 He ended up joining Justice Brennan’s opinion to hold
the provision unconstitutional.
By the end of his career, he was fully on board. He had come
to see Roe v. Wade23 as a decision not just about doctors and their
patients, but also about women’s place in society. One of his very
last opinions came in J.E.B. v. Alabama,24 in April 1994, holding
that gender is an impermissible basis for the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges in jury selection. The Supreme Court case grew out
of a paternity and child support action in Alabama state court, in
which the state, representing the interests of the mother, used nine
of ten peremptories to remove male jurors, creating an all-female
jury. “When state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance
on gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of
the relative abilities of men and women,”25 Justice Blackmun wrote.
“It denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror and, for a woman,
reinvokes a history of exclusion from political participation.”26 Jus-
tice Ginsburg silently joined this majority opinion. She had done
her work. There was nothing she needed to add.






23 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
25 Id. at 140.
26 Id. at 142.
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I called her a “judicial-restraint liberal.”27 By that, I meant that she
has a liberal vision of a muscular and broadly inclusive Constitu-
tion coupled with a pragmatist’s sense that the most efficacious way
of achieving the Constitution’s highest potential as an engine of
social progress is not necessarily through the exercise of judicial
supremacy. During her visit to CUNY Law School, she made clear
that the protection of civil liberties is not a job for judges alone—in
fact, that judges alone cannot do the job.
In the question-and-answer session following her formal re-
marks, the Justice was asked to list “the most important legal issues
that you believe the United States Supreme Court faces today.”28
Here is her reply:
I would like to amend the question slightly to say: “what are the
most important issues that the people of the United States are
facing today?” Every day the question of the balance between
liberty and security is before us. I have said on that subject that
people, the people of the United States, take great pride in our
heritage; that we love liberty and cherish freedom; and that we
have not been given to security concerns to the extent some
other countries have. Will we be able to preserve that spirit
given the current challenges? If the people don’t care about pre-
serving their liberty and are overwhelmed by security concerns,
there is no court that can change that sad development. But I
am confident that it won’t happen in the United States, because
the people do care. The courts, you know, are reactive institu-
tions. We don’t create the controversies that come to us, we re-
spond to the problems that are emerging in the society the
courts exists to serve. The Supreme Court will respond to these
challenges, but there must be people out there to bring them
and support them.29
That stance as a “judicial-restraint liberal” has enabled her to
speak to both sides of the court and to win not only the affection,
but the respect of her colleagues. Who would have believed that
Chief Justice Rehnquist would join her in invalidating the Virginia
Military Institute’s all-male admissions policy,30 or that last term, in
upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act against an Eleventh
Amendment attack, he would write an opinion that sounded as if
he was channeling for her—talking about the burden placed on
27 Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Sense of Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1994, at A1.
28 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks at the City University of New York School
of Law (Mar. 11, 2004), 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 221, 232 (2004).
29 Id.
30 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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women by the stereotyped assumption that if an emergency arises
at home, they are the ones who will leave the office to deal with it.31
Harry Blackmun was not an easy sell, but that made his even-
tual conversion all the sweeter. To show you just how tough a job it
was, let me quote from a memo I found in his file from November,
1980, thirteen years before Justice Ginsburg would join the court.
It had just occurred to the Justices that they would have a female
colleague someday, probably someday soon (and they were right—
it happened six months later). What to do about the traditional
appellation, “Mr. Justice”? The proposal was made to eliminate the
“Mr.”
Justice Blackmun objected. “It seems to me that of late we
tend to panic and to get terribly excited about some rather incon-
sequential things,” he said in a letter to Chief Justice Burger that
he circulated to all his colleagues.32 “I regard this as one of them
. . . . We seem to be eliminating, step by step, all aspects of diverse-
ness, and we give impetus to the trend toward a colorless society.”
He concluded: “As Hugo Black once despairingly said (and how
well I remember), ‘All these changes around here!’”33
There have indeed been changes around here.
31 Nevada Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
32 H.A.B. Collection, Container 1548, folder 4.
33 Id.

